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ABSTRACT
The conventional wisdom views high levels of education as a prerequisite for democracy. This paper
shows that existing evidence for this view is based on cross-sectional correlations, which disappear
once we look at within-country variation. In other words, there is no evidence that countries that
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T h ec o n v e n t i o n a lw i s d o m ,s i n c ea tl e a s tt h e writings of John Dewey (1916), views high
levels of educational attainment as a prerequisite for democracy. Education is argued
to promote democracy both because it enables a "culture of democracy" to develop, and
because it leads to greater prosperity, which is also thought to cause political development.
The most celebrated version of this argument is modernization theory, popularized by
Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), which emphasizes the role of education as well as economic
growth in promoting political development in general and democracy in particular. Lipset,
for example, argues that
“Education presumably broadens men’s outlooks, enables them to under-
stand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to ex-
tremist and monistic doctrinies, and increases their capacity to make rational
electoral choices.” (p. 79),
and concludes
“If we cannot say that a "high" level of education is a suﬃcient condition
for democracy, the available evidence does suggest that it comes close to being
a necessary condition” (p. 80).
Recent empirical work, for example, by Robert Barro (1999) and Adam Przeworski,
Michael Alvarez, José A. Cheibub and Fernando Limongi (2000), provides evidence con-
sistent with this view. Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and
Andrei Shleifer (2004) go further and argue that diﬀerences in schooling are a major
causal factor explaining not only diﬀerences in democracy, but more generally in political
institutions, and provide evidence consistent with this view.
The high correlation between schooling and democracy, depicted in Figure 1, is the
cornerstone of this view. This ﬁgure shows the most common measure of democracy,
the Freedom House index of political rights, against the average years of schooling of
the population in the 1990s (see below for data details). Correlation does not establish
causation, however.
Existing literature looks at the cross-sectional correlation between education and
democracy rather than at the within variation. Hence existing inferences may be po-
tentially driven by omitted factors inﬂuencing both education and democracy in the long
run. A causal link between education and democracy suggests that we should also see a
1relationship between changes in education and changes in democracy. In other words, we
should ask whether a given country (with its other characteristics held constant) is more
l i k e l yt ob e c o m em o r ed e m o c r a t i ca si t sp o p u l a t i o nb e c o m e sm o r ee d u c a t e d . W es h o w
t h a tt h ea n s w e rt ot h i sq u e s t i o ni sn o .F i g u r e2i l l u s t r a t e st h i sb yp l o t t i n gt h ec h a n g ei n
the Freedom House democracy score between 1970 and 1995 versus the change in average
years of schooling during the same time period. Countries that become more educated
show no greater tendency to become more democratic. In this light, the pattern in Fig-
u r e1s e e m st ob ed r i v e nb ys o m ec o m m o no m i t t e df a c t o r sa ﬀecting both education and
democracy.
We further investigate these issues econometrically. We show that the cross-sectional
relationship between schooling and democracy disappears when country ﬁxed eﬀects are
included in the regression. Although ﬁxed eﬀects regressions are not a panacea against all
biases arising in pooled OLS regressions, they are very useful in removing the potential
long-run determinants of both education and democracy. We also document that the
lack of a relationship between education and democracy is highly robust to diﬀerent
econometric techniques, to estimation in various diﬀerent samples, and to the inclusion
of diﬀerent sets of covariates.
The recent paper Glaeser, et al. (2004) also exploits the time-series variation in democ-
racy and education, and presents evidence that changes in schooling predict changes in
democracy and other political institutions. However, we document below that this result
stems from their omission of time eﬀects in the regressions, so it reﬂects the over-time
increase in education and democracy at the world level over the past 35 years. Once we
include year dummies in their regressions, the impact of education on democracy disap-
pears entirely. Motivated by the Glaeser, et al. (2004) paper, we also show that there is
no eﬀect of education on other measures of political institutions.
In addition to the studies mentioned above, our paper is related to the large political
economy literature on the creation and consolidation of democracy, which we do not have
enough space to discuss here (see Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, 2004, for a
discussion of this literature). It is also related to our companion paper by Acemoglu, Si-
mon Johnson, Robinson and Pierre Yared (2004), which investigates the other basic tenet
of the modernization hypothesis, that income (and economic growth) causes democracy.
In that paper, using both ﬁxed eﬀects OLS and instrumental variable regressions, we show
that there is little evidence in favor of a causal eﬀect from income to democracy either.
We also oﬀer a theory for the diﬀerences in long-run factors causing the joint evolution of
education, income, and democracy, and we provide supporting evidence for this theory.
2The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂy describe the data.
In Section 3 we present our main results. Section 4 documents the robustness of these
results. Section 5 shows that there is no evidence of a causal eﬀect of education on other
measures of political institutions. Section 6 concludes.
2D a t a
We follow the existing literature in economics and measure democracy using the Freedom
House Political Rights Index (see Freedom House, 2004). This index ranges from 1 to
7, with 7 representing the least amount of political freedom and 1 the most freedom. A
country gets a score of 1 if political rights come closest to the ideals suggested by a check-
list of questions, beginning with whether there are free and fair elections, whether those
who are elected rule, whether there are competitive parties or other political groupings,
whether the opposition plays an important role and has actual power, and whether minor-
ity groups have reasonable self-government or can participate in the government through
informal consensus. Following Barro (1999), we supplement this index with the related
variable from Kenneth Bollen (1990, 2001) for 1955, 1960, and 1965, and we transform
both indices so that they lie between 0 and 1, with 1 corresponding to the most democratic
set of institutions.
We also show that our results are robust to using the other two popular measures in the
literature, the composite Polity index, and the dichotomous democracy index developed
by Przeworski, et al. (2000) and extended by Carles Boix and Sebastian Rosato (2001)
which are all normalized between 0 and 1 for comparison. Because of space restrictions,
we do not describe these data here and refer the reader to Acemoglu et al. (2004) for
details, and also for descriptive statistics on the key variables.
Our main right-hand side variable, average years of schooling in the total population
of age 25 and above, is from Barro and Jong-Wha Lee (2000) and is available in ﬁve year
intervals between 1960 and 2000. The value of this variable in our base sample ranges
from 0.04 to 12.18 years of schooling with a mean of 4.65.
Our basic dataset is a ﬁve-yearly panel, where we take the democracy score for each
country every ﬁfth year. This results in an unbalanced panel of 108 countries spanning the
period between 1965 and 2000, with a total of 765 observations with countries included if
they have been independent for at least ﬁve years, where independence year is determined
using the CIA World Factbook (2004). We prefer using the observations every ﬁfth year
to averaging the ﬁve-yearly data, since averaging introduces additional serial correlation
3as we document below. Nevertheless, our results are robust to using ﬁve-year averages.
We also report robustness checks using 10-year data between 1970 and 2000 and using
subsamples that exclude former and current socialist countries, Sub-Saharan Africa, and
predominantly Muslim countries.
3R e s u l t s
Table 1 provides our main results using the Freedom House data. Column 1 shows the
pooled OLS relationship between education and democracy by estimating the following
model:
dit = αdit−1 + γsit−1 + µt + vit (1)
where dit is the democracy score of country i in period t. The lagged value of this
variable is included on the right hand side to capture persistence in democracy and also
potentially mean-reverting dynamics in democracy (i.e., the tendency of the democracy
score to return to some equilibrium value for the country). The main variable of interest is
sit−1, the lagged value of average years of schooling. The parameter γ therefore measures
whether education has an eﬀect on democracy. µt denotes a full set of time eﬀects, which
capture common shocks to (common trends in) the democracy score of all countries, and
vit is an error term, capturing all other omitted factors.
Column 1 shows a statistically signiﬁcant correlation between of education and democ-
racy. The estimate of γ is 0.027 with a standard error of 0.004, which is signiﬁcant at
1%.1 If causal, this estimate would imply that an additional year of schooling increases
the "steady-state" value of democracy by 0.093 (≈ 0.027/(1−0.709), where the long-run
eﬀect is calculated as γ/(1 − α)). This is a reasonably large magnitude relative to the
mean of democracy in the sample which is 0.57. Notice that this estimate includes both
the direct and the indirect eﬀect of education on democracy working through income
(since greater education corresponds to greater income, which might also lead to more
democracy). Below we also report models that estimate the separate eﬀect of education
and income.
Equation (1) is similar to the regressions in the existing literature in that it does not
control for country ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus the entire long-run diﬀerences across countries are
used to estimate the eﬀect of education on democracy. As a result, omitted factors that
inﬂuence both democracy and education in the long run will lead to spurious positive
estimates of γ.
1All the standard errors are robust for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and clustering at the country level.
4The alternative is to allow for the presence of such omitted factors (that are not
time-varying) by including a country ﬁxed eﬀects, by estimating a model of the form
dit = αdit−1 + γsit−1 + µt + δi + uit, (2)
which only diﬀers from (1) because of the full set of country dummies, the δi’s.
The rest of Table 1 reports estimates of γ from models similar to (2). Column 2 is
identical to column 1 except for the ﬁxed country eﬀects, the δi’s. The results are radically
diﬀerent, however. Now γ is estimated to be -0.005 with a standard error of 0.019, thus
it is highly insigniﬁc a n ta n dh a st h eo p p o s i t es i g nt ot h a tp r e d i c t e db yt h em o d e r n i z a t i o n
hypothesis (and to that found in the pooled OLS regression of column 1).
In the regression in column 2, because the regressor dit−1 is mechanically correlated
with uis for s<t ,t h es t a n d a r dﬁxed eﬀect estimation is not consistent in panels with a
short time dimension (e.g., Jeﬀery M. Wooldridge, 2002, chapter 11). Our ﬁrst strategy
to deal with this problem, adopted in column 3, is to use the methodology proposed by
Theodore W. Anderson and Cheng Hsiao (1982). This involves time diﬀerencing equation
(2) to eliminate the δi’s, which yields ∆dit = α∆dit−1+γ∆sit−1+∆µt+∆uit.I nt h ea b s e n c e
of serial correlation in the original residual, uit (i.e., no second order serial correlation in
∆uit), dit−2 is uncorrelated with ∆uit, so can be used as instrument for ∆dit−1 to obtain
consistent estimates. We ﬁnd that this procedure leads to even more negative estimates,
for example, in our basic speciﬁcation, γ is now estimated to be -0.018 (standard error =
0.021), and shows no evidence of a positive eﬀect of education on democracy.
Although the instrumental variable estimator of Anderson and Hsiao (1982) leads to
consistent estimates, it is not eﬃcient, since, under the assumption of no further serial
correlation in uit, not only dit−2, but all further lags of dit are uncorrelated with ∆uit,a n d
can also be used as additional instruments. Manuel Arellano and Stephen R. Bond (1991)
develop a Generalized Method-of-Moments Estimator (GMM) using all of these moment
conditions. We use this GMM estimator in column 4. The estimate for γ is similar to that
in column 3, -0.017 (standard error = 0.022). The presence of multiple instruments in the
GMM procedure allows us to investigate whether the assumption of no serial correlation
in uit can be rejected and also to test for overidentifying restrictions. The AR(2) test and
the Hansen J test, reported at the bottom of this column, indicate that there is no further
serial correlation and the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected.
Columns 5 and 6 repeat the ﬁxed eﬀects OLS and GMM regressions from columns
2 and 4 using ﬁve-year averages of democracy, with very similar (and more negative)
estimates. But now the AR(2) test shows residual serial correlation and the Hansen J
5test rejects the overidentifying restrictions because of the additional serial correlation
introduced by averaging. This motivates our focus on the dataset using the observations
every ﬁf t hy e a rr a t h e rt h a na v e r a g i n gt h eﬁve-yearly observations.
Columns 7 and 8 repeat these regressions with ten-year data, again with very similar
results (though now the estimate of γ is positive and insigniﬁcant with the ﬁxed eﬀects
OLS).
These results therefore cast considerable doubt on the causal eﬀect of education on
democracy.
4R o b u s t n e s s
Table 2 documents the robustness of these ﬁndings to alternative samples. We only report
the ﬁxed eﬀects OLS and GMM regressions to save space.
One concern is whether the presence of socialist countries, where the persistence and
t h el a t e rc o l l a p s eo fn o n - d e m o c r a t i cr e g i m e sm i g h th a v ev e r yd i ﬀerent causes, is driving
these results. This may be a valid concern, since some of these former socialist countries
already had high levels of education in the 1980s and did not experience any marked
increase in education during or immediately prior to transition. Columns 1 and 2 exclude
former and current socialist countries, and show that these countries had no eﬀect on
the results. The estimates of γ are very similar to those in Table 1. For example, the
estimate with ﬁxed eﬀects OLS is -0.003 (standard error = 0 .019) and with GMM -0.015
(standard error =0.022).
Another concern is whether results are a due to the unstable political dynamics in
sub-Saharan Africa, or potentially driven by Muslim countries, which have lower levels of
schooling and have been slower to democratize. Columns 3 and 4 exclude Sub-Saharan
African countries and columns 5 and 6 exclude countries where more than 40% of the
population is Muslim. The results are very similar to the baseline in both cases.
Finally, another concern is whether the results are due to the use of the Freedom
House data. To show that our results are robust across diﬀerent datasets, columns 7
and 8 report our basic ﬁxed eﬀects OLS and GMM regressions using the Polity dataset,
and columns 9 and 10 report our basic ﬁxed eﬀects OLS and GMM regressions using the
Boix-Rosato dataset (which extends Przeworski et al.’s data to the present). The results
are again similar.
In order to address the concern that the omission of certain variables are causing our
result, Table 3 shows that controlling for a range of important covariates leaves these
6basic pattern unchanged. We focus on the Freedom House data and report the basic ﬁxed
eﬀects OLS and GMM regressions. Columns 1 and 2 control for the age structure and
population by including the fractions of the population in ﬁve diﬀerent age ranges, the
median age of the population, and the logarithm of total population.2 These variables are
correlated with average educational attainment of the population, and might have a direct
eﬀect, making it impossible for us to identify the inﬂuence of education on democracy. We
ﬁnd that the age structure variables are jointly signiﬁcant at 10% using ﬁxed eﬀects but
not GMM, while log population is not signiﬁcant. The eﬀect of education on democracy
continues to be highly insigniﬁcant in both cases.
Columns 3 and 4 control for the investment share of GDP, which is itself insigniﬁcant
and has no eﬀect on the sign or magnitude of the education variable. Columns 5 and 6
add income per capita. Education is still insigniﬁcant (and has a negative coeﬃcient),
and interestingly, income per capita itself is insigniﬁcant with a negative coeﬃcient.3 The
causal eﬀect of income on democracy, which is the other basic tenet of the moderniza-
tion hypothesis, is therefore also not robust to controlling for country ﬁxed eﬀects. We
investigate this issue in greater detail in Acemoglu, et al. (2004).
Finally, columns 7 and 8 control for all of these covariates simultaneously, again with
similar results.
5 From Education to Institutions?
The recent paper by Glaeser, et al. (2004) argues that there is a causal eﬀect of education
on institutions. They substantiate this by reporting regressions similar to our model in
(2), but with very diﬀerent results, in particular showing a positive eﬀect of education on
democracy. Why are their results diﬀerent from ours?
In Table 4 panel A, we replicate their results, which use the constraint on executive
from Polity, the autocracy score from Polity, the democracy score from Polity, and the
autocracy score from Przeworski et al.4 These columns exactly match their regressions,
but are diﬀerent from our corresponding regressions, because they do not include time
eﬀects, the µt’s in equations (1) and (2). In the absence of time eﬀects, the parameter
2The ranges are 0 to 15, 15 to 30, 30 to 45, 45 to 60, and 60 and above. Age ranges and median age
are from United Nations Population Division (2003) and population is from World Bank (2002).
3Investment Share of GDP and GDP per Capita are from the Penn World Tables dataset in Alan
Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten (2002).
4The only diﬀerence from their results is that, instead of using autocracy scores like they do, we
transform everything to democracy, so that all coeﬃcients have the same sign. Note that for these
results, the index of institutions is not normalized between 0 and 1.
7γ is identiﬁed from the over-time variation, in this context, the world-level increase in
education and democracy. This clearly does not correspond to any causal eﬀect.
Panels B and C report estimates with and without income per capita, but including
time eﬀects as in our basic speciﬁcations. In all cases education is insigniﬁcant and has
the incorrect sign as in our basic results. Moreover, in all columns except one, the time
eﬀects are jointly signiﬁcant at 1% or less, and in that one case they are signiﬁcant at
10% (and interestingly, in that case, as column 4 shows, education is insigniﬁcant even
without time eﬀects).
The evidence in Table 4 therefore shows that there seems to be no eﬀect of education
on democracy or on other political institutions.
6 Concluding Remarks
A common view clearly articulated by the modernization theory claims that high levels
of schooling are both a prerequisite for democracy and a major cause of democratization.
The evidence in favor of this view is largely based on cross-sectional or pooled cross-
sectional regressions. This paper documents that this evidence is not robust to including
ﬁxed eﬀects and exploiting the within-country variation. This strongly suggests that the
cross-sectional relationship between education and democracy is driven by omitted factors
inﬂuencing both education and democracy rather than a causal relationship.
This evidence poses two important questions:
1. Is there no long-run causal relationship between education and democracy? It is
important to emphasize that our paper does not answer this question. We have
exploited the ﬁve and ten yearly variation in the postwar era. It is possible that
changes in education have very long run aﬀects, say over 50 or 100 years, that do
not manifest themselves in the shorter timeframe that we have looked at.
2. What are the omitted factors inﬂuencing both education and democracy, captured
by the country ﬁxed eﬀects? We conjecture that these are related to the joint evolu-
tion of economic and political development ("the historical development paths"). In
our companion paper, Acemoglu, et al. (2004) we provide evidence consistent with
this conjecture. We document that the ﬁxed eﬀects for the former European colonies
are very highly correlated with the historical, potentially-exogenous determinants of
institutional development in this sample, in particular, the mortality rates faced by
8the European settlers and the density of the indigenous populations (see, Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson, 2001 and 2002) as well as early experiences with democracy.
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Figure 1Freedom House Political Rights Index is normalized from 0 to 1 and is from Freedom House (2004). Average years of schooling  in the adult population (25 years of age 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Democracy t-1 0.709 0.385 0.525 0.507 0.540 0.717 -0.027 0.337
(0.035) (0.053) (0.117) (0.096) (0.044) (0.071) (0.090) (0.136)
Education t-1 0.027 -0.005 -0.018 -0.017 -0.015 -0.038 0.013 -0.027
(0.004) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (0.033) (0.029)
Time Effects F-test [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.33] [0.02]
Hansen J Test [0.31] [0.04] [0.13]
AR(2) Test [0.81] [0.00] [0.29]
Observations 765 765 667 667 765 667 373 275
Countries 108 108 104 104 108 104 106 104
R-squared 0.71 0.78 0.85 0.76
5-year data




10-year data  5-year data in averages
Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2, 5, and 7 with country dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Column 3 uses instrumental variables method of Anderson 
and Hsiao (1982), with clustered standard errors, and columns 4, 6, and 8 use GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991), with robust standard errors. Year dummies are included in all regressions, and the 
time effects F-test gives the p-value for their joint significance. Dependent variable is augmented Freedom House Political Rights Index. Base sample in columns 1,2,3, and 4 is an unbalanced panel, 
1965-2000, with data at 5-year intervals in levels and the base sample in columns 5 and 6 is an unbalanced panel, 1965-2000, with data at 5-year intervals in averages; the start date of the panel refers 
to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1965, so t-1=1960). Base sample in columns 7 and 8 is an unbalanced panel, 1970-2000, with data at 10-year intervals in levels; the start date of the panel refers to the 




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Democracy t-1 0.353 0.498 0.396 0.432 0.382 0.569 0.476 0.674 0.291 0.324
(0.053) (0.095) (0.062) (0.105) (0.059) (0.093) (0.063) (0.103) (0.070) (0.109)
Education t-1 -0.003 -0.015 0.006 -0.005 0.007 -0.022 -0.015 -0.028 0.006 -0.015
(0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.024) (0.019) (0.025) (0.039) (0.036)
Time Effects F-test [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.00] [0.04] [0.54] [0.23]
Hansen J Test [0.38] [0.42] [0.32] [0.06] [0.69]
AR(2) Test [0.71] [0.90] [0.96] [0.36] [0.10]
Observations 732 639 586 513 622 545 718 603 674 589
Countries 103 99 80 78 85 84 105 102 108 105
R-squared 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.82 0.77
Table 2
Fixed Effects Results: Alternative Samples
Dependent Variable is Democracy
Base Sample, 1965-2000, 
without Former and 
Current Socialist 
Countries
Base Sample, 1965-2000, 
without Muslim 
Countries




Base Sample, 1965-2000, 
using Polity Composite 
Index
Base Sample, 1965-2000, 
using Przeworski 
Democracy Index
Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 with country dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 use GMM of Arellano and Bond
(1991), with robust standard errors. Year dummies are included in all regressions, and the time effects F-test gives the p-value for their joint significance. Dependent variable is augmented Freedom 
House Political Rights Index in columns 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Dependent variable is Polity Composite Index in columns 7 and 8 and dependent variable is Przeworski et al. Democracy Index in columns 9 
and 10. Base sample in all columns is an unbalanced panel, 1965-2000, with data at 5-year intervals in levels where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1965, so t-1=1960). 
Columns 1 and 2 exclude Soviet block countries and countries with socialist legal origin. Columns 3 and 4 exclude sub-Saharan African countries. Columns 5 and 6 exclude countries where the percent 
of the population which is Muslim in 1980 exceeds 40 percent. Socialist legal origin and percent of the population which is Muslim in 1980 is from La Porta et al. (1999). Countries enter the panel if they 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Democracy t-1 0.362 0.493 0.373 0.549 0.369 0.510 0.350 0.492
(0.053) (0.101) (0.055) (0.093) (0.054) (0.094) (0.055) (0.098)
Education t-1 0.005 -0.013 -0.014 -0.028 -0.012 -0.013 -0.007 -0.017
(0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.023) (0.019) (0.026) (0.020) (0.027)
Age Structure F-test [0.08] [0.31] [0.21] [0.32]
Log Population t-1 -0.124 -0.023 -0.047 0.027
(0.101) (0.115) (0.109) (0.144)
Investment Share of GDP t-1 0.026 0.145 0.088 0.291
(0.191) (0.208) (0.195) (0.251)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 -0.012 -0.187 -0.006 -0.169
(0.042) (0.110) (0.049) (0.202)
Time Effects F-test [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Hansen J Test [0.21] [0.47] [0.44] [0.31]
AR(2) Test [0.89] [0.91] [0.96] [0.91]
Observations 746 652 688 599 684 595 676 589
Countries 104 101 97 93 97 93 95 92
R-squared 0.78 0.76 0.76 0.77
Table 3
Fixed Effects Results: Alternative Covariates
Dependent Variable is Democracy
Base Sample, 1965-2000
5-year Data
Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 with country dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 use GMM of Arellano and 
Bond (1991), with robust standard errors; columns 6 and 8 treat Log GDP per Capita  t-1 as predetermined and instrument its first difference with Log GDP per Capita t-2. Year dummies are included 
in all regressions, and the time effects F-test gives the p-value for their joint significance. Dependent variable is augmented Freedom House Political Rights Index.  Base sample in all columns is an 
unbalanced panel, 1965-2000, with data at 5-year intervals in levels where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1965, so t-1=1960).  Columns 1, 2, 7, and 8 include but 
do not display the median age of the population at t-1 and 4 covariates corresponding to the percent of the population at t-1 in the following age groups: 0-15, 15-30, 30-45, and 45-60. The age 
structure F-test is gives the p-value for the joint significance of these variables.  Countries enter the panel if they are independent at t-1. See text for data definitions and sources.Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: No Time Effects
Exec. Autocracy Democracy Autocracy
Institutions t-1 -0.572 -0.547 -0.515 -0.864
(0.072) (0.068) (0.065) (0.103)
Education t-1 0.498 0.909 0.700 0.096
(0.119) (0.179) (0.180) (0.071)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.038 -0.508 0.292 0.267
(0.403) (0.630) (0.606) (0.202)
R-squared 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.47
Panel B: Including Time Effects
Exec. Autocracy Democracy Autocracy
Institutions t-1 -0.618 -0.616 -0.580 -0.897
(0.073) (0.071) (0.067) (0.106)
Education t-1 -0.163 -0.318 -0.432 -0.137
(0.192) (0.267) (0.298) (0.126)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.168 -0.317 0.477 0.292
(0.360) (0.550) (0.561) (0.192)
Time Effects F-test [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.08]
R-squared 0.39 0.40 0.37 0.50
Panel C: Including Time Effects
Exec. Autocracy Democracy Autocracy
Institutions t-1 -0.617 -0.615 -0.579 -0.891
(0.073) (0.071) (0.068) (0.107)
Education t-1 -0.125 -0.389 -0.324 -0.088
(0.182) (0.229) (0.289) (0.125)
Time Effects F-test [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.07]
R-squared 0.39 0.40 0.37 0.49
Observations 499 499 499 349
Table 4
5-year data
Glaeser et al. (2004) Sample, 1965-2000
Fixed Effects Results: Education, Democracy, and Political Institutions
Dependent Variable is Change in Institutions
Dependent Variable is Change in Institutions
Dependent Variable is Change in Institutions
Fixed effects OLS regressions in all columns with country dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Year 
dummies are included in panels B and C, and the time effects F-test gives the p-value for their joint significance. Dependent variable in 
column 1 is change in Constraint on the Executive from Polity. Dependent variable in column 2 is change in negative Autocracy Index from 
Polity. Dependent variable in column 3 is change in Democracy Index from Polity. Dependent variable in column 4 is change in negative 
Autocracy Index from Przeworski et al. (2000). Base sample in all columns is an unbalanced panel, 1965-2000, with data at 5-year intervals 
where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1965, so t-1=1960).  See Glaeser et al. (2004) for data definitions 
and sources.